FOLLOWING THE terrorist attack in Mumbai on November 26, a heated debate is going on in the country whether India should exercise its option of war with Pakistan as a means for combating the menace of terrorism. A similar exercise was carried out after the terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on December 13, 2001, to no avail. Let us hope that the present uproar does not also end in a whimper after sometime like the earlier one with India not even, perhaps, having the satisfaction of threatening to go to war and keeping Pakistan on tenterhooks for nearly one year, like it did following the earlier incident. It will be a pity if this happens because while last time the option of going to war was believed to have been given up under US pressure, no such obstacle seems to be in sight at present. In fact, in the present situation not only the US but the entire world opinion also appears to be on India’s side.

Knowing without a shadow of doubt that Pakistan is not only sheltering terrorists engaged in attacks in India but also encouraging its citizens in carrying out such disruptive activity, there can be no solution to the problem of terrorism against India without the cooperation of Pakistan. Pakistan’s cooperation is necessary in meeting India’s two immediate requirements. One, in apprehending and handing over to India known Indian terrorists who have found shelter in Pakistan as also some of its own citizens involved in terrorist activities in India and details of whom have already been handed over to Pakistan and two, dismantling of terrorists training camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. With Pakistan’s avowed policy objective of inflicting “a thousand cuts” on India to make it bleed to death, (as propounded by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto after Pakistan’s ignominious defeat in the Indo-Pak war of 1971), it should not be surprising if Pakistan is showing no inclination towards voluntary cooperation with India in this respect. Evidently, then, there would appear to be no choice for India other than using force for extracting such cooperation. The question that arises is why India is dithering from going to war with Pakistan over the issue loaded with dire consequences for our country. Some of the factors that could be preventing the UPA government from taking the plunge are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

General abhorrence for wars

The general bane of the Indian political leadership since Independence has been that it has failed to recognise war as an instrument of state policy. It has consistently sought to further the country’s interests through diplomacy, which appears to be an alternative to war, not realising that for diplomacy to be effective it needs to be backed by military strength. Little wonder then that even as the country has, since Independence, fought a record number of four regular wars and an irregular one that is still continuing, none of them has been of India’s own making in furtherance of national interests. It must be understood that though war is an evil, it is a necessary evil that forms an essential part of the nature’s supreme law of survival of the fittest and the consequent struggle for existence. Today, India’s very existence is threatened and if it goes to war on this count, it would be for the most righteous cause.

In any case India is already at war with Pakistan, even if it be a war by proxy. This war is, in fact, a continuation of earlier wars that Pakistan has fought unsuccessfully with India but of the type that affords an advantage to Pakistan, quite disproportionate to its effort and even capacity to wage an open war. By going to war with Pakistan now India would only be converting the ongoing proxy war of Pakistan’s making into an open war of our choosing to deprive Pakistan of the privileges that it is enjoying through its war by proxy.

Fear of nuclear fire-break

Many people also seem to be exercised about the possibility of such an action resulting in a nuclear war. Apparently, Pakistan is deliberately giving air to such a possibility in an attempt to restrain India from taking recourse to war. It needs to be understood that the most trustworthy defence against a nuclear attack is the development of a second strike capability. The ability of a country to strike back with similar weapons acts as a very effective deterrent to the first use of nuclear weapons by another. It is because of the second strike capability having been developed by most potential enemies that no nuclear weapons have been used since after their first use by the United States in 1945, against Japan while the latter did not possess a retaliatory capability. India has a very effective second strike capability that could inflict incalculable and unacceptable damage to Pakistan and no amount of desperation or even madness on the part of its political or military leaders can prompt them to make the first use of nuclear weapons.

Inadequate force level

It is also possible that India is unable to exercise the option of war because of, what appears to be, inadequacy of its conventional military strength for conducting a decisive all out war against Pakistan. Even as we may well take pride in our glorious victories against Pakistan it may be remembered that while the decisive victory in 1971 was due to the local superiority of 2:1 that India was able to build up against East Bengal by taking the serious risk of pulling out troops from the Indo-Tibetan border, the victory at Kargil was won through the strategy of localising the war and thereby building up overwhelming numerical and fire power superiority against the Pakistani intruders. It is, perhaps, feared that India may not be able to carry out such localised fighting in the proposed next war with Pakistan, which is likely to be an all out war of Aar ya paar with the set and irrevocable objective of forcing Pakistan to submit to our demands.

A country’s force level is determined by either the national objective of preventing the enemy from forcing its will on it or the national objective of forcing its own will on the enemy. India’s force level has evidently been determined with the former objective in mind in keeping with the temperament, attitude and thinking of the Indian political leadership past and present. Consequently, although presently India’s military strength is, perhaps, more than double that of Pakistan, its numerous other security/defence commitments preclude the possibility of it mustering more than a marginal overall superiority in any war with Pakistan.

In military calculations, this little edge in military strength on Pakistan may be enough to prevent Pakistan from forcing its will on us but would be totally inadequate for us to be able to force our will on it through a decisive war. Any war at this force level, therefore, could only result in a stalemate of the 1965 type.

Any Indo-Pak war fought now would however, be different from the ones we have already fought. For one, Pakistan will be devoid of US support to bail it out of the mess that it may land in, as it had been receiving in the past. Secondly, with China also worried about Pakistani terrorists infiltrating into its own vulnerable territories, the China factor that has been preventing India in the past from transferring troops from the Eastern to the Western front to deal effectively with Pakistan would not, hopefully, come into full play this time. Be that as it may, deficiencies in military strength, if any, should spur us on to action rather than push us into hibernation. With its vast reservoir of finest fighting material in the world and a booming economy, building up adequate military strength to fight a decisive war with Pakistan should be no problem for India. All that is required is the will of the Indian political leadership to act. The war can wait till then if necessary.