THERE IS talk that the Sixth Pay Commission for government servants would recommend efficiency-linked promotions and pay rise. That there is a vital need to increase efficiency in the delivery of public services goes without saying. It is a common refrain of the public and the Press that the standard of performance of public servants, over the years, has been steadily going down. The government at the highest level too seems to acknowledge it and has often publicly lamented this fact. It has also, in the past, initiated studies and measures to redress the situation by laying emphasis on ‘performance’ in appraisal forms of the officers; particularly at senior levels. It is quite plausible therefore that performance linked pay rise /promotion may be considered as another concrete measure aimed at realising more satisfactory performance output from public servants.

On the face of it such a proposal, of linking promotions and pay rise with efficiency parameters, appears eminently desirable and laudable. It would be welcomed by the citizens. It would also be welcomed by those civil servants who give off their best but are treated just the same as those who refuse to work or are at best are ditherers. In fact, quite often in the civil service he or she who can keep the boss happy prospers more than the sincere, hard working type. The latter is usually landed with all the difficult and challenging tasks but is rarely given deserving appreciation for his or her achievement. What is more unfortunate is the fact that this trend has been steadily growing over the years. It is creating a great deal of heartburn and dissatisfaction among the dwindling breed of earnest, hardworking civil servants.

It is this reality of civil service life, which compels one to wonder how honestly the system of performance appraisal would work and whether it would really yield the desired result. Much would depend upon the system design providing for clear-cut performance parameters and an objective assessment of implementation appraisal. In fact, even in the past there has always been considerable emphasis laid on performance appraisal in the annual confidential reports (ACRs). Quantifiable self -appraisal, detailed evaluation, and grading by a succession of senior officers have been, for years, a standing feature of the ACRs. Even the comments about integrity are recorded. And yet, we are nowhere near achieving the desired result. On the contrary, perception about falling standards of civil service performance suggests that the ACRs do not often reflect the merits of an officer.

This could be the result of various factors such as, systemic failure to clearly demarcate role and apportion specific responsibility in each case; inability of appraising staff to give sufficient time and attention to monitor and evaluate objectively performance of their juniors and unwillingness of the superiors to appraise their subordinates honestly and candidly. An adverse entry, to be sustainable, requires great deal of supporting material and often long drawn tussle between the reporting and reported officer. Few officers are prepared to undergo this process. The objectivity in assessments is therefore often sacrificed at the altar of buying peace and avoiding unpleasantness.

This would continue to dog any system of performance appraisal unless a system of audit of performance by a group of seasoned officers is introduced. The level of responsibility and devolution of powers should be clearly earmarked for each level of officers within a Ministry/ Department or, office. Then, from time to time, test check of performance of individual officers should be carried out by a panel of outside officers. The panel could comprise serving or retired officers and should be rotated from time to time. The panel should be authorised to evaluate the work of individual officers on the basis of specific file notings. The existing criteria of evaluation viz, initiative, monitoring, decision taking, etc, may be kept in view while scanning sample files. The panel could also discuss such cases with the concerned officers so as to ensure that no injustice in evaluation occurs.

A system like this would be akin to a concurrent audit of the performance of an officer. As this would be by a panel of practitioners themselves, they would be able to introduce in the assessment pragmatism and objectivity. The officer writing the ACR should take such an assessment into account. This would obviate any criticism of bias in evaluation and at the same time keep all officers alive to their responsibility all the year round. The rotation of panel would further ensure objectivity in evaluating the work of an individual officer. This system could also focus on some of the complaint cases so as to give relief to the complainants where so merited. A proper framework and procedure of evaluation would need to be adopted.

The periodic micro monitoring and evaluation of the work of public servants can go a long way in making them more responsible and alive to their responsibilities. It is the key to improving administrative efficiency in public services.