Firstly, the political leaders and ministers need to understand that every time we deploy the army for counter insurgency duties, we are reducing its capability to fight a conventional war against Pakistan or China. This is because whenever an infantry battalion or an artillery regiment is deployed for counter insurgency operations, their heavy equipment like artillery guns, mortars, anti tank and anti aircraft weapons are mothballed. Training completely stops. Training in conventional warfare, combined arms operation and air ground operations also stopS. There is no time for basic military training like physical training and drill. This was the objective of former Pakistani President Zia ul Haq’s strategy of weakening the Indian Army by encouraging and supporting insurgency and terrorism and making India bleed from a thousand cuts.Secondly, the army has not ended any insurgency. It has only contained the level of violence. The Naga insurgency started in 1954 and the army was involved in it from 1956. The insurgency ended with the Shillong Accord of 1974. The Naga insurgents have not surrendered and negotiations still continue. The insurgency in Mizoram started in 1966 and army was deployed. The insurgency ended in 1987 when Rajeev Gandhi solved it with a negotiated settlement which gave political power to Mizo National Front. Insurgency started in 1965 and army is deployed. The insurgency has not been defeated. The insurgency in Assam started in 1982-83 and army is deployed. The insurgency has not been defeated. The insurgency in Kashmir stared in 1990 and army has been deployed since then. The insurgency has not ended. Army cannot solve insurgencies. Israel with its military might has not been able to defeat the Palestine militants in 60 years. Insurgencies have to be dealt with politically. Thirdly, the army does not have forces to deploy against the Maoists. Much of the army, alt least 100,000 soldiers, is deployed for counter insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir, a tiny state, to fight 1500 to 3000 insurgents. There is no end to the violence. The army has another 15,000 to 20,000 troops to fight 400 ULFA cadres, 200 Bodo insurgents and 400 or so Manipuri insurgents in the North Eastern states. The affected area is much smaller than the Maoist affected areas which cover almost a quarter of the country. The area is also the most under developed hilly jungle terrain. The strength of the Maoist armed cadre is between 20,000 and 30,000. An infantry battalion can control at best a “Tehsil” or Subdivision. The army will have to deploy at least seven to ten divisions to have any effect on the level of violence. It cannot deploy such resources without reducing troops on Pakistani and Chinese borders.Fourthly, army units have to balance field and peace tenures. If this arrangement is disturbed by deploying army against the Maoists, the morale of the army will be affected. Without high morale, no army in the world can fight effectively. Many retired and serving officers feel that the capability of the Army to fight a conventional war against Pakistan and China is already below acceptable level because of their employment in fighting insurgencies and shortage of officers. What ever be the reality, it will be obvious that army should not be deployed against the Maoists. The Chief of Army and Air Force Staff have clearly said so.